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I. INTRODUCTION
Ensuring sufficient water supply is a paramount concern of govern-
ment throughout the arid West.  The scarcity of water influences virtu-
ally every aspect of the vast region’s economy and environment,1 and
has been a simmering source of interstate and federal-state conflict for
more than a century.  To facilitate the equitable sharing of water,
avoid strife, encourage economic development, and forestall federal
intervention, states have proactively entered into more than thirty
agreements among themselves to address the allocation and appropri-
ation of water across state borders and water sources.2  Such interstate
compacts—the “oldest mechanism available to promote formal inter-
† The Author wishes to extend a special thanks to Michael B. Kimberly with
Mayer Brown LLP for his assistance with the Article.
1. Olen Paul Matthews & Michael Pease, The Commerce Clause, Interstate Com-
pacts, and Marketing Water across State Boundaries, 46 NAT. RES. J. 601, 602 (2006).
2. See National Counsel for Interstate Compacts, Compact Search Results, APPS.
CSG.ORG (Feb. 11, 2013), http://tinyurl.com/bvvmqbc.
15
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state cooperation”3—are authorized by § 10 of the Constitution.4
They are, at bottom, contracts between and among states;5 contracts
that must be approved by Congress before taking effect, and once ap-
proved, assume the status of federal law.6  Although not a panacea,
these water compacts have become a vital tool in water management
throughout the country.
There is a very important dispute over one such compact currently
pending before the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari. Tar-
rant Regional Water District v. Herrmann7 is a lawsuit between North
Texas’s Tarrant Regional Water District (“TRWD”) and the
Oklahoma Water Resources Board (“OWRB”) concerning Texas’s
right under the Red River Compact—which allocates water from the
Red River system among Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisi-
ana—to access water located in Oklahoma.  At issue in the case are
two significant questions of federal constitutional law: (1) Whether the
Red River Compact—an agreement designed to enhance cooperation
and resource sharing among its signatories, and using language pre-
sent in virtually all water compacts between western states—expressly
authorizes Oklahoma to hoard its water by enacting discriminatory
state water laws that otherwise would be invalid under the Dormant
Commerce Clause; and (2) whether compact language that allocates to
the signatory states “equal” shares of water within a particular region
preempts protectionist state laws that obstruct other states from acces-
sing their allotted share of the water in another state.  The Tenth Cir-
cuit answered the former in the affirmative and the latter in the
negative.  How the Supreme Court answers these questions will have
far-ranging consequences for the future vitality of existing water com-
pacts and the likelihood of future agreements.
The purpose of this essay is to familiarize readers with the facts and
background of these issues in this important case, and to lay out the
policy implications inherent in its resolution.  This Article begins by
providing some background and history regarding management of,
and disputes over, water in the United States, with an emphasis on the
value of interstate compacts in resolving and preventing disputes.  The
path of the current dispute between Texas and Oklahoma requires the
Article to trace three things: (1) describing the creation of the Red
River Compact as well as its terms; (2) detailing TRWD’s need for
water and Oklahoma’s water export restrictions; and (3) laying out the
3. See generally CAROLINE N. BROUN ET AL., THE EVOLVING USE AND THE
CHANGING ROLE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS, A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 3 (2006).
4. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
5. See generally CATHERINE BROUN ET AL., THE EVOLVING USE AND THE
CHANGING ROLE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS, A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 64 (2006).
6. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983).
7. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2011), pet. for
cert. filed (U.S. No. 11-889).
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reasoning of the Tenth Circuit below8 and the parties’ certiorari-stage
legal arguments.  Finally, the Author will explain what she believes are
the consequences and policy implications at stake in the resolution of
this dispute.
II. RESOLVING INTERSTATE WATER DISPUTES
As the world has developed economically and its population has
exploded, the need for fresh water has grown dramatically.  As with
most other vital natural resources, this growing need is sowing discord
between resource rich and resource poor countries.9  That water stub-
bornly refuses to respect political boundaries only increases the poten-
tial for conflict.
Such water-based conflicts, although a relatively recent phenome-
non on the world stage, are well-known to the United States.  Despite
regular acknowledgement that a primary purpose of our union is to
make “each State . . . the greater by a division of its resources, natural
and created, with every other State, and those of every other State
with it,”10 states have often jealously guarded their resources (and
water in particular), which has in turn led to conflicts with other
states, and with the federal government.  This Section will discuss the
recurring conflicts over water and attempts to resolve them through
Congressional action, legal proceedings, and interstate compacts, con-
cluding with a discussion of the superiority of compacts as a resolution
mechanism.  Understanding this background will allow better appreci-
ation of what is at stake in this case.
A. Frequent Disputes
Reflecting the importance of the resource, disputes between states
over water are as old as the country itself—older, in fact.  Maryland
and Virginia, for example, have laid conflicting claims to the Potomac
River since the Seventeenth Century.11
As the United States expanded westward into more arid regions of
the continent, these conflicts became more frequent.  Western dis-
putes over water occurred throughout the Twentieth Century and in-
8. The Author will focus on the legal issues that are raised in the petition for
certiorari.
9. Lee A. Laudicina, Note, International Water Disputes: How to Prevent a War
Over the Nile River, 4 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 235 (2007) (“United Nations figures
suggest there are nearly 300 potential water conflicts around the world.”). See also
Jeffrey Sachs, Stemming the Water Wars, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2009), http://www.
guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/apr/26/water-shortage (noting the link
between water shortages and international conflicts in arid lands, warning that “future
water stresses will be widespread, [spanning] both rich and poor countries.”).
10. West v. Kan. Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911).
11. Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 60 (2003).
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volved nearly every state in the region.12  Perhaps the most famous of
these western water disputes involved Arizona, California, and the
Federal Government.  In 1934, the Bureau of Reclamation began con-
structing a dam on the Colorado River that would straddle the border
of Arizona and California.13  The Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California was bankrolling the dam’s construction, a major
purpose of which was to supply the growing communities of Southern
California with water.14  Arizona objected, and not satisfied with the
federal response, ultimately mounted an armed resistance, with the
Arizona National Guard commandeering two ferry boats—dubbed
the “Arizona Navy”—filling them with armed men, and sending them
up the Colorado.15  Thankfully, the dispute ended peacefully;16 never-
theless, the episode serves as an important reminder of the passions
water disputes can stir.
In recent years, water disputes have boomeranged back east. Mary-
land and Virginia renewed their dispute over access to the Potomac in
the early 2000s.17  Georgia, Alabama, and Florida have been em-
broiled in a twenty-plus year dispute over flow from the Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint River basin as conflicting demands familiar in
the west—population growth, environmental protection, and agricul-
ture—come to a head in the southeast.18  And the Great Lakes, the
largest source of fresh surface water in the United States, is sure to be
the battleground of the future.19  Thus, it is unlikely that any region of
the country will remain immune from these types of disputes, increas-
ing the importance of finding effective modes of dispute resolution
while encouraging interstate cooperation.
B. Dispute Resolution: Federal Intervention
The three dominant modes of resolving interstate water disputes
are (1) congressional action, (2) federal court decree, and (3) inter-
12. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584 (1993) (Platte River); Colorado
v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982) (Vermejo River); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S.
517 (1936) (Walla Walla River); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (Laramie
River).
13. John B. Draper, et al., Gunboats on the Colorado: Interstate Water Controver-
sies, Past and Present, 55 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW
INST. § 18.01 (2009).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.  After a case before the Supreme Court, Arizona acquiesced in the project
in exchange for irrigation project approvals.
17. Virginia, 540 U.S. at 56.
18. See In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1165 (11th Cir. 2011).
19. See, e.g., Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water
Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 429–30 (2006).
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state compact.20  The Author will begin with the first two, before turn-
ing to the most often utilized mode of resolution: compacts.
In Arizona v. California,21 the Supreme Court first explicitly ac-
knowledged Congress’s power to unilaterally apportion water among
states under the Commerce Clause.  Congress has exercised this
power in only three instances over the last 100-plus years.22  Congress
has also occasionally acted unilaterally to delegate to states more
power over their water resources.23  Congress has not eschewed action
in this area for lack of interest in, or experience with, the nation’s
water resources, however: it regularly legislates in the area of water
quality and environmental protection, and the federal government—
through the Bureau of Reclamation—remains the largest wholesaler
of water in the nation.24  Rather, it is likely Congress has largely
avoided the business of interstate water allocation and apportionment
because of the intense local and regional interests and passions in-
volved.  But it is not hard to see this reticence dissipating in the future
as interstate conflicts over water grow and intensify.
The federal courts find themselves attempting to resolve interstate
water disputes more often than Congress, although such occasions are
still relatively rare.  The Supreme Court has reluctantly confronted a
handful of interstate water disputes via its original jurisdiction,25 while
lower courts have entertained battles between state proxies.26  The
doctrine followed by courts in such cases is known as “equitable ap-
portionment,” which, as the name suggests, calls for a consideration
by the court of numerous factors in order to achieve the fairest distri-
bution of disputed water.27  The outcomes of such equitable analyses
20. There can be combinations, of course.  Interstate compacts require congres-
sional approval; federal courts may hear disputes arising from compacts, etc.
21. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 546.
22. The Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act, H.R. 3941,
101st Cong. (1990); The Boulder Canyon Project Act, H.R. 5773, 70th Cong. (1928);
Act of February 25, 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-108 ch. 798, 33 Stat. 814 (relating to the
construction of a dam and reservoir on the Rio Grande, in New Mexico, for the im-
pounding of flood waters of said river for purposes of irrigation).
23. See, e.g., Water Resources Development Act, 100 Stat. 4082 (1986). The law
provides, inter alia, that “[n]o water shall be diverted or exported from any portion of
the Great Lakes within the United States, from any tributary within the United States
of any of the Great Lakes, for use outside the Great Lakes basin unless such diversion
or export is approved by the Governor of each of the Great Lake States.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1962d–20(d) (2006).
24. Bureau of Reclamation, Facts & Information, USBR.GOV (Jan. 24, 2013), http://
www.usbr.gov/main/about/fact.html.
25. See supra note 12. R
26. See, e.g., In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2011).
27. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945) (stating “Priority of appro-
priation is the guiding principle.  But physical and climatic conditions, the consump-
tive use of water in the several sections of the river, the character and rate of return
flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical
effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to upstream areas as com-
pared to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former—
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are inevitably unpredictable, not helped by the fact that “equitable
allocation tends to present questions that do not draw on judicial com-
petence.”28  Despite this lack of institutional competence, in the ab-
sence of cooperation between states, we can expect many more suits
in our water-scarce future, because “[a]s the value of water rises, so
does the value of a . . . judgment allocating it.”29
C. Dispute Resolution: Interstate Compacts
By far the most successful method of resolving interstate disputes
over water has been the interstate compact.  The first water allocation
compact, the Colorado River Compact of 1922, was precipitated by
the Supreme Court’s decision in Wyoming v. Colorado—preceding its
equitable apportionment line of cases—where it held that the default
rule for determining the allocation of the nation’s water resources is
the rule of “prior appropriation”: the first person to use a quantity of
water from a water source for a beneficial use has the right to con-
tinue to use that quantity of water for that purpose.30  This doctrine,
as the states involved realized, created a collective action problem by
incentivizing users to put all available water sources into immediate
use in order to avoid losing their rights to it.31  The Colorado River
Compact of 1922 was designed to forestall this problem by allocating
water ex ante according to a negotiated agreement, rather than by the
arbitrary development of senior priorities.32  In the decades since the
Colorado River Compact, many other states (primarily in the west)
have negotiated tens of additional interstate water compacts, with
more the thirty such agreements in place across the country.  These
compacts play a central role in regulating the allocation, appro-
priation, development, exportation, and management of western
waterways.
The events leading to the creation of the Colorado River Compact
demonstrate perhaps the most valuable result and the driving force
behind most interstate water compacts: solving collective action
problems while creating settled expectations that make the develop-
these are all relevant factors.  They are merely an illustrative, not an exhaustive, cata-
logue.  They indicate the nature of the problem of apportionment and the delicate
adjustment of interests which must be made.”).
28. Jonathan Horne, On Not Resolving Interstate Disputes, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIB-
ERTY 95, 111 (2011).
29. Id. at 101.
30. Wyoming, 259 U.S. at  470.
31. See Leila C. Behnampour, Comment, Reforming a Western Water Institution:
How Expanding the Productivity of Water Rights Could Lessen Our Water Woes, 41
ENVTL. L. 201, 209–10 (2011) (“[P]rior appropriation principles actually create incen-
tives to use as much water as possible to ensure continuance of the amount of water in
the right.”).
32. See Arizona, 373 U.S. at 553–59.
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ment of reliable, long-term water supplies possible.33  Important in al-
lowing the settling of expectations is that compacts function as
contracts, and should later disputes arise regarding the application of
a compact, courts must interpret and enforce the compact “within the
four corners of the agreement.”34  Without these agreements, uncer-
tainty would reign as allocations would be resolved only as disputes
arose, and through unpredictable litigation or federal lobbying.  Such
uncertainty would surely retard economic development throughout
water-scarce regions.35  Thus, as compared to amorphous doctrines
such as “equitable apportionment,” the ex ante ordering of rights by
interstate compact is far preferable.
The benefits of interstate compacts do not end there.  As noted by
Justice Felix Frankfurter, compacts allow states to free themselves
from strict legal rules and reach a “sensible compromise” in a
nonadversarial environment.36  In addition, and related, compacts en-
courage water allocations and apportionments based on input from
stakeholders on the ground, considering myriad regional, state, and
local interests, and force policy makers to sit and think about the fu-
ture management of resources.37
Furthermore, and particularly important to the culture and politics
of western states, states resolving water disputes on their own “effec-
tively preempt federal interference into matters that are traditionally
within the purview of the states but that have regional or national
implications.”38  Ongoing disputes between states always carry with
them the specter of top-down solutions imposed by Congress.  Impor-
tantly for our discussion, this specter fades only when a compact is
effective in ending a dispute. Should a dispute reignite, the threat of
congressional interference reemerges.39  Crucially, any congressional
33. BROUN ET AL., supra note 5, at 26, 267; accord Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S.
554, 567 (1983).
34. BROUN ET AL., supra note 5, at 64.
35. See Horne, supra note 28, at 149 (stating “[B]ecause citizens of these states
must plan economic activity that depends on particular rights to the waters, states
must (sooner or later) negotiate with each other to secure protection for this
activity.”).
36. Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitu-
tion—A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 706–07 (1925).
37. Justin Newell Hesser, Comment, The Nature of Interstate Groundwater Re-
sources and the Need for States to Effectively Manage the Resource Through Interstate
Compacts, 11 WYO. L. REV. 25, 42 (2011).
38. BROUN ET AL., supra note 5, at 27. R
39. See, e.g., Bob Ewegen, Editorial, McCain Suggests Raiding Colorado’s Water,
Denver Post, DENVERPOST.COM (Aug. 16, 2008), http://www.denverpost.com/opinion/
ci_10218277 (“The problem, from Colorado’s perspective, is that in the 76 years since
the [Colorado River] compact was signed, California, Nevada and Arizona have
grown much more rapidly in population—and political power—than the upper basin
states.  So when the lower basin states talk about ‘renegotiating’ the compact, that’s
their code for a process of give and take—in which Colorado, Utah, New Mexico and
Wyoming give and California, Arizona and Nevada take.”).
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action subsequent to a congressionally-approved interstate compact
can supersede provisions of that compact.  Despite the need for con-
gressional approval, almost all compacts are agreements solely be-
tween states, which do not bind Congress.40  Accordingly, “Congress
may use its substantial legislative power . . . to significantly erode the
purpose or regulatory authority of a compact.”41  It is imperative,
then, if states wish to maintain control over their water, that they con-
tinue to cooperate, and work towards mutually beneficial solutions,
even after the compacts enter force.
Finally, the cooperation and coordination required by interstate
compacts has the benefit of strengthening our union and preventing
strife.  As states sit down at the negotiating table, then transform from
rivals into partners.  In contrast, without agreement, states will con-
tinue to jealously guard resources located within their borders and
fight each other in court and in Congress, undermining the very the-
ory upon which the U.S. Constitution was framed, i.e., “that the peo-
ples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the
long run, prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.”42
Moreover, and more ominously, “[t]he intentional, self-serving nature
of [such] protectionist measure[s] is likely to invoke anxiety in other
states and invite hostile retaliatory measures.”43  A scenario we would
surely all wish to avoid.
Given these benefits, and the shortcomings of the alternatives, it is
no surprise that both Congress and the courts strongly encourage
states to resolve water disputes via compact.  The Supreme Court
rarely misses an opportunity to encourage state parties before it to sit
down at the bargaining table:
[S]o awkward and unsatisfactory is the available litigious solution
for these problems that this Court deemed it appropriate to empha-
size the practical constitutional alternative provided by the Com-
pact Clause. Experience led us to suggest that a problem such as
that involved here is more likely to be wisely solved by cooperative
study and by conference and mutual concession on the part of rep-
resentatives of the States so vitally interested in it than by proceed-
ings in any court however constituted.44
Likewise, Congress puts such value on interstate agreements concern-
ing the allocation and apportionment of water, that approval for fed-
40. BROUN ET AL., supra note 5, at 43–44; John D. Leshy, Interstate Groundwater R
Resources: The Federal Role, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVT’L L. & POL’Y 1475, 1483
(2008).
41. BROUN ET AL., supra note 5, at 44. R
42. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
43. Catherine Gauge O’Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of Interstate
Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 571,
580 (1997).
44. West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 27 (1951) (quotation marks
omitted).
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eral water projects is often conditioned upon the execution of such
compacts.45
III. THE CURRENT DISPUTE
In this Section, the Author lays out the facts and legal arguments at
issue in Tarrant.  This Section first discusses the Red River system and
the interstate compact governing it.  The Author then describes
TRWD’s water predicament and its plan to acquire water from
Oklahoma.  The Author next details Oklahoma’s legislative and regu-
latory regime, which effectively prevents the exportation of water out
of the state.  The Section ends by summarizing the reasoning of the
Tenth Circuit in its ruling for Oklahoma and each side’s arguments
before the Supreme Court.
A. The Red River & the Red River Compact
The Red River is a major tributary of the Mississippi River.  It rises
in two primary forks from the Texas Panhandle and flows east, adja-
cent to the border between Texas and Oklahoma.  It thereafter marks
a portion of the border between Texas and Arkansas before flowing
through Arkansas and Louisiana and discharging into the Gulf of
Mexico.
Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, having been “moved
by considerations of interstate comity,” and with the consent of Con-
gress, executed the Red River Compact (“the Compact”).  The com-
pact was executed in order to, inter alia, “promote interstate comity
and remove causes of controversy between each of the affected
states” by “provid[ing] an equitable apportionment among the Signa-
tory States of the water of the Red River and its tributaries,” thereby
enabling “state planning and action by ascertaining and identifying
each state’s share in the interstate water of the Red River Basin.”46
The Compact divides the Red River Basin into five “Reaches,” and
those Reaches into respective subbasins. Reach 2, subbasin 5—the
primary subject of dispute between TRWD and OWRB—is defined
geographically without reference to state borders.  This subbasin cov-
ers an area that includes territory within Arkansas, Oklahoma, and
Texas.47  Although just 22% of the subbasin falls geographically within
Oklahoma,48 a majority of the subbasin’s water is located there.49  The
main stem of the river itself falls within Oklahoma along Oklahoma’s
border with Texas; the vegetation line of the river’s south bank marks
the boundary between the two states, resulting in the main channel of
45. BROUN ET AL., supra note 5, at 267. R
46. Red River Compact § 1.01; TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 46.013 (West 2011).
47. Id. at § 5.05(a); Herrmann, 656 F.3d at 1250 (map).
48. Red River Compact § 5.05(a); 656 F.3d at 1250 (chart).
49. Herrmann, 656 F.3d at 1251 (chart).
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the Red River lying wholly within Oklahoma.  Just 17.4% of the yield
of the subbasin’s water is located within Texas, and only a small frac-
tion of that is useful as a source for municipal water supply.  The main
stem of the Red River is high in saline and thus not useful as a source
of potable water.50  Instead, the primary potable water sources within
Reach 2, subbasin 5 include the fresh-water tributaries to the Red
River, immediately before they discharge into the main stem and be-
come polluted by the river’s salinity.
In section 5.05, the Compact allocates water within Reach 2 sub-
basin 5 by reference to these fresh water sources and such allocations
are dependent on the rate of flow downstream into Louisiana.  As
relevant here, the Compact provides that “so long as the flow of the
Red River at the Arkansas-Louisiana state boundary is 3,000 cubic
feet per second or more,” each signatory state “shall have equal rights
to the use of runoff originating in . . . and undesignated water flowing
into” Reach 2, subbasin 5.  With an eye towards maintaining the 3,000
cubic feet per second flow into Louisiana, the Compact limits these
“equal rights” by constraining each state to no “more than 25 percent
of the water in excess of 3,000 cubic feet per second” at the Arkansas-
Louisiana state boundary.51  In other words, once the flow of the Red
River into Louisiana hits 3,000 cubic feet per second, the “equal
rights” provision kicks in, but in order to keep the flow into Louisiana
at or above 3,000 cubic feet per second, none of the four signatory
states may take more than one-quarter of that excess flow.  The mean-
ings of “equal rights” and “25 percent” share are at the heart of the
preemption issue in this case.  Other provisions of the Compact im-
portant to this case, both to the preemption and Dormant Commerce
Clause analyses are as follows.  Section 2.01 provides that “[e]ach Sig-
natory State may use the water allocated to it by this Compact in any
manner deemed beneficial by that state.”52  It provides further that
“[e]ach state may freely administer water rights and uses in accor-
dance with the laws of that state,” but that “such use shall be subject
to the availability of water in accordance with the apportionments
made by this Compact.”53  Section 2.10, using language that appears in
similar form in almost every interstate water compact, provides that
50. U.S. Geological Survey, Stream Monitoring and Educational Program in the
Red River Basin, Texas, Fact Sheet 170–97 (1997), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/
fs-170-97/FS_170-97.htm (citations omitted) (stating “Salinity is the greatest limitation
on water use in the Red River Basin and is largely the result of naturally occurring
salt springs in parts of the upper reaches of the basin.  The salt sources contribute
water with large concentrations of dissolved solids, principally chloride.  At certain
times and locations, the salinity of streams in the basin exceeds that of seawater.”).
51. Red River Compact § 5.05(b)(1) (explaining the signatories are allocated dif-
ferent shares of subbasin 5 water when the Red River’s flow is below 3,000, 1,000, or
526 cubic feet per second at various locations.). Id. at § 5.05(b)(2)–(3), (c).  The flow
of the river substantially exceeds 3000 cfs the great majority of the time.
52. Id. at § 2.01.
53. Id.
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“nothing in this compact shall be deemed” to “interfere with or impair
the right” of “any Signatory State to regulate within its boundaries the
appropriation, use, and control of water,” provided that its exercise of
that right is “not inconsistent with its obligations under this Com-
pact.”54  In addition, although seemingly unrelated to the water in dis-
pute in this case, section 4.02(b) ends up playing an important role in
the Tenth Circuit’s analysis.  Section 4.02 governs water allocation
from Reach 1, subbasin 2. Subsection 4.02(b) grants to Oklahoma
“free and unrestricted use of the water of this subbasin.”55  Finally,
and essential to TRWD’s challenge, there is no provision in Compact
that declares expressly that any signatory state’s use or regulation of
water within its boundaries is free from the limitations imposed by the
dormant Commerce Clause, or from obligations under the Compact.
B. TRWD’s Proposal to Appropriate Water from Oklahoma
From four reservoirs and through more than 150 miles of pipeline,
TRWD provides water to over two million residents of North Central
Texas through its wholesale customers.  In cooperation with other
North Texas water suppliers, TRWD is charged with developing addi-
tional water resources to meet the current and future demands of the
region. TRWD is “an entity created under Texas law . . . to obtain
water” for Texas residents; it therefore is authorized to invoke, and
obtain water pursuant to, “Texas’s water rights under the Red River
Compact.”56
TRWD is in dire need of new sources of water.57  It currently sup-
plies 448,800 acre feet58 of water per year59 to more than 100 whole-
sale customers, who in turn serve the Dallas Fort-Worth metroplex,
the nation’s fourth largest metropolitan area. TRWD’s long term plan
shows that by 2060, the population of Dallas-Fort Worth will have
more than doubled, and its customers’ demand for water will exceed
supply by more than 477,000 acre feet, or 155 billion gallons, per
year.60
In addition to these long-range needs, TRWD also faces an immi-
nent water shortage as a result of extreme drought.  Media coverage
54. Id. at § 2.10.
55. Id. § 4.02(b).
56. Brief of Amicus Curiae the State of Texas in support of Appellant, Herrmann,
656 F.3d 1222, NO. CIV-07-45-HE, 2010 WL 416578, at *1–2.
57. See Freese and Nichols, Inc. et al., Recommended Water Management Strate-
gies for Whole Water Providers, 2011 REGION C WATER PLAN 4E.1 at 4E.14 (Oct.
2010), available at http://www.regioncwater.org/Documents/2011RegionCWaterPlan/
Chapter%204E_final.pdf [hereinafter WATER PLAN].
58. An acre foot is the volume of one acre of surface area to a depth of one foot
and is equal to 325,853 gallons; 448,800 acre feet equals approximately 146 billion
gallons.
59. WATER PLAN, supra note 57, at 4E.14.
60. WATER PLAN, supra note 57, at 4E.18.
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has characterized Texas’s drought condition as “catastrophic,” costing
Texas more than $5 billion in recent agricultural losses.61  As a result
of the drought, TRWD estimates that it will face a 50,000 acre foot per
year shortfall in less than eight years’ time.62
Oklahoma, by contrast, sits within the heart of the Mississippi River
watershed and, in the words of the OWRB, is “blessed with an abun-
dance of water.”63  OWRB estimates that the entire state of
Oklahoma currently uses less than two million acre feet per year of
stream water.64  Another 34 million acre feet of unused water flows
out of Oklahoma annually, bound for the Gulf of Mexico.  From the
southeast part of Oklahoma alone, more than twelve times the volume
of TRWD’s entire projected 2060 shortfall is discharged to the Gulf of
Mexico each year.  And OWRB has acknowledged that “the average
annual flow of the six major river basins in southeastern Oklahoma is
6,363,628 acre feet,” which is enough to supply the entire state of
Oklahoma three times over.65
Consistent with the Texas State and Region C Water Plans, TRWD
has identified water it claims is apportioned to Texas—but located
within Oklahoma, just a few miles north of its border with Texas—as
among the most practical sources of water for addressing both its im-
mediate and long-term needs.66 In the permit application underlying
this lawsuit, TRWD proposed taking 310,000 acre feet of its share of
Reach 2, subbasin 5 water from the Kiamichi River, not far above
where it discharges into the Red River.  The proposal involves placing
pumps into the tributary and running underground pipelines to ex-
isting reservoirs serving TRWD and other regional water suppliers.
The project would require both a federal environmental impact as-
sessment and a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers.  Because
the plan uses existing reservoir infrastructure and does not involve
pumping water vast distances to a higher elevation, it has a lesser envi-
ronmental impact than TRWD’s other options.67  And time is of the
essence: TRWD estimates that, with lead times for alignment plan-
61. Kate Galbraith, Catastrophic Drought in Texas Causes Global Economic Rip-
ples, N.Y.TIMES (Oct. 31, 2011), available at http://tinyurl.com/tarrant6.
62. WATER PLAN, supra note 57, at 4E.14.
63. 2012 OKLAHOMA COMPREHENSIVE WATER PLAN EXECUTIVE REPORT, 3
(Feb. 2012), http://www.owrb.ok.gov/supply/ocwp/pdf_ocwp/WaterPlanUpdate/draft
reports/OCWP%20Executive%20Rpt%20FINAL.pdf.
64. Id.
65. OKLA. WATER RES. BD., STATUS REPORT TO THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR:
JOINT STATE/TRIBAL WATERS COMPACT  & WATER MARKETING PROPOSAL, 27
(2002), http://www.owrb.ok.gov/studies/legislative/southeast/southeast_pdf/Status%20
Report_Part%201.pdf.
66. WATER PLAN, supra note 57, at 4E.15–16.
67. Alternatives to drawing water from within Oklahoma involve obtaining water
from sources to the south and east of the Metroplex and pumping the water to a
higher elevation over hundreds of miles.  These alternatives (including taking water
from Wright Patman Lake and constructing a new Tehuacana Reservoir) are substan-
tially more expensive than the Oklahoma project and involve far greater environmen-
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\1a-1\TWR208.txt unknown Seq: 13  4-NOV-13 8:31
2013] INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS 27
ning, environmental review, permitting, design engineering, and con-
struction, it will be fifteen to twenty years before water can be
delivered.
C. Oklahoma’s Water Embargo
Notwithstanding Oklahoma’s enormous water reserves, Oklahoma
has enacted a panoply of laws that, taken together, prohibit OWRB
from issuing permits for out-of-state water use.  OWRB’s executive
director has openly acknowledged that Oklahoma’s restrictive water
laws were intended to “protect Oklahoma’s water supply” against
“out-of-state” water users and “actually strengthen” its protectionist
scheme as compared with the state’s prior express moratorium on the
removal of water from the state.68  As a consequence, these laws pre-
vent TRWD from obtaining water that originates in Oklahoma.
Oklahoma law requires any entity (including any “state or federal
governmental agency” like TRWD) that “intend[s] to acquire the
right to the beneficial use of any water” within Oklahoma to apply to
the OWRB for “a permit to appropriate” before “commencing any
construction” or “taking [any water] from any constructed works.”69
Several aspects of the Oklahoma permitting scheme make it impossi-
ble for an out-of-state water user to obtain a permit to appropriate.
First is an opinion from the Oklahoma Attorney General issued in
1978, and still binding on the OWRB,70 stating that no “out-of-state
user is a proper permit applicant before [OWRB].”71  Second is
Oklahoma’s express public policy, which OWRB is statutorily re-
quired to “effectuat[e],”72 that “[w]ater use within Oklahoma . . . be
developed to the maximum extent feasible for the benefit of
Oklahoma so that out-of-state downstream users will not acquire
vested rights therein to the detriment of the citizens of this state.”73
Third is the time restriction placed on out-of-state users that that, as a
tal impacts, both in terms of new infrastructure and massive electricity usage.  See
WATER PLAN, supra note 57, at 4D.9–10, 4D.20, 4E.21, Table 4D.6.
68. New Bill Protects Oklahoma Water Rights, OKLA. WATER NEWS 4, (2009),
available at http://tinyurl.com/tarrant5 (Oklahoma earlier had in force an outright
statutory prohibition on exports of water for out-of-state use). See OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 82, § 1B (West Supp. 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 1221.A (West Supp. 2012)
(the express moratorium expired in 2009, during the pendency of this action and was
replaced with the collection of discriminatory statutes discussed in text).
69. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 105.9 (West 1990).
70. Hendrick v. Walters, 865 P.2d 1232, 1243 (Okla. 1993). (“Public officers have
the duty to follow [the] opinions [of the Oklahoma Attorney General] until they are
judicially relieved of compliance.”).  No court has overruled the aforementioned
opinion.
71. Okla. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 77–274 (1978).
72. Id. at § 1086.2 (West Supp. 2012).
73. Id. at § 1086.1(A)(3) (because out-of-state use of water necessarily precludes
in-state use of that water for any purpose (including recreation and “conservation”),
arguably any permit to appropriate water for out-of-state use is “to the detriment” of
Oklahomans).
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practical matter, is a categorical bar to major municipal proposals like
TRWD’s.74  Finally, there is Oklahoma’s express preference for in-
state uses over “[u]se[s] of water outside the state.”75  The practical
upshot of this statutory scheme is a categorical prohibition against
permits to appropriate Oklahoma surface water for use in another
state.
D. The Tenth Circuit’s Decision
At the same time that TRWD filed its permit applications with
OWRB, it filed suit against the members of OWRB in federal district
court in Oklahoma, alleging, inter alia, (1) that Oklahoma’s water em-
bargo laws violate the Dormant Commerce Clause by unduly restrict-
ing interstate commerce in water, and (2) that the Red River
Compact—specifically the “equal rights” provision of section
5.05(b)(1)—preempts the Oklahoma statutes that prevent TRWD’s
appropriation of water from Reach 2, subbasin 5.  TRWD sought a
declaratory judgment to that effect and an injunction prohibiting
OWRB from enforcing the statutes.  The parties agreed by joint stipu-
lation, approved by the court, that no action will be taken on TRWD’s
application until the lawsuit has concluded.  The district court granted
summary judgment to OWRB on both claims,76 and the Tenth Circuit
affirmed.
1. Dormant Commerce Clause
In addressing the Dormant Commerce Clause issue, the court of
appeals focused its inquiry on whether Congress, in giving its consent
to the Compact had consented to Oklahoma’s restrictions on water
export.  By way of background, courts have held that the Commerce
Clause restricts states “from engaging in purposeful economic protec-
tionism.”77  Export restrictions on natural resources are one form of
such disfavored protectionism,78 and in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas,79 the Supreme Court held that water is an article of com-
74. A permit to appropriate surface water for out-of-state use must provide “that
the whole of the amount of the water authorized by the permit [will] be put to benefi-
cial use within a period of less than seven years.” Id. § 105.16(A).  Given the enor-
mous lead time necessary for planning and construction—greater than 15 years—this
limit functions as an absolute bar to TRWD’s proposal.
75. Id. § 105.12(A)(5).  In passing on an application for out-of-state use, OWRB
must, for example, “evaluate whether the water that is the subject of the application
could feasibly be transported to alleviate water shortages in the State of Oklahoma”
instead.
76. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, NO. CIV-07-0045-HE, 2009 WL
3922803 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2009).
77. Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1986).
78. Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1025 (1983) (“[A] State may not
preserve solely for its own inhabitants natural resources located within its borders.”).
79. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982).
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merce and thus state laws burdening its trade are subject to Dormant
Commerce Clause constraints.  Congress, however, may “permit the
states to regulate the commerce in a manner which would otherwise
not be permissible”80 by making a “clear expression of approval.”81
The court held that the Compact itself—despite its avowed purpose to
“promote interstate comity and remove causes of controversy” among
the signatories—actually contains this clear expression of approval
from Congress for Oklahoma to prohibit water export.  In doing so,
the court of appeals did not point to a provision of the Compact that
contained this approval, rather it held, “the broad language of key
Compact provisions” provided “the clear statement of congressional
authorization of state regulation that Sporhase and Wunnicke
require.”82
In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals found that “the
Compact provisions using words and phrases such as ‘unrestricted
use,’ ‘control,’ ‘in any manner,’ ‘freely administer,’ and ‘nothing shall
be deemed to interfere’ give the Oklahoma Legislature wide latitude
to regulate interstate commerce in its state’s apportioned water.”83
Those phrases come from three Compact provisions described above:
“unrestricted use” is from section 4.02(b), which governs allocations
from Reach 1, subbasin 2; “in any manner” and “freely administer”
come from section 2.01, while “control” and “nothing shall be deemed
to interfere” come from section 2.10(a), both general provisions of the
Compact.  The court of appeals also relied in part on the Compact’s
“Interpretive Comments”84—which “the Compact’s Negotiating
Committee wrote . . . so that future readers might be apprised of the
intent” of the drafting committee,85 and which state “each state is free
to continue its existing internal water administration, or to modify it in
any manner it deems appropriate.”86—to confirm its reading of the
Compact.
2. Preemption
The court of appeals also rejected TRWD’s Supremacy Clause
claim that the Compact’s “equal rights” provision preempts
Oklahoma laws that prevent TRWD from appropriating water allo-
cated to it from parts of Reach 2, subbasin 5.  Invoking the presump-
tion against preemption, the court deemed the presumption
“particularly strong in this case” because of a general history of “def-
erence to state water law by Congress.”87  The court then focused in
80. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87–88 (1984).
81. Id. at 92.
82. Herrmann, 656 F.3d at 1222, 1237.
83. Id. at 1239.
84. Id. at 1238.
85. Id. at 1228.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1242 (quotation marks omitted).
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on and the language in section 2.10 of the Compact—“Nothing in this
Compact shall be deemed to: (a) Interfere with or impair the right or
power of any Signatory State to regulate within its boundaries the ap-
propriation, use, and control of water, or quality of water, not incon-
sistent with its obligations under this Compact”—concluding that it
was an “interpretive rule of non-interference” whereby Congress, in
consenting to the Compact, deferred to state regulation.88  Further,
the court bootstrapped from its previous Dormant Commerce Clause
analysis, reasoning that “a compact that authorizes state regulatory
water laws so as to insulate them from dormant Commerce Clause
challenge, as this one does, is unlikely to preempt those very same
laws.”89
The court acknowledged that state powers cannot be exercised in a
manner inconsistent with the terms of the Compact, as stated in sec-
tion 2.10(a).  But, employing the presumption against preemption, it
interpreted the “equal rights to the use” guaranteed by sec-
tion 5.05(b)(1) of the Compact, when read in the context of the mini-
mum flow provisions in the rest of section 5.05, to merely ensure that
“an equitable share of water from the subbasin reaches the states
downstream from Oklahoma and Texas.”90  Once minimum down-
stream flow requirements are met, according to the court, section 5.05
gives equal rights to use of the excess, but does not entitle a “Texas
user” to “take Texas’s share of that water from a tributary located in
Oklahoma,” even though Texas’s share is not available to it from
Texas sources.91  Having read the Compact in this way, the court held
that it does not conflict with Oklahoma law.
E. The Parties’ Legal Arguments at the Certiorari Stage
1. TRWD
TRWD argues in its petition for certiorari that, in reaching its con-
clusions on each issue, the Tenth Circuit misread and rewrote provi-
sions of the Compact, misused the presumption against preemption,
and misapplied clear Supreme Court precedent.  TRWD insists that
nothing in the Compact indicates Congress’s acquiescence to
Oklahoma’s discriminatory water export regime and that the plain
language of the Compact “allocates an equal portion of the disputed
water to Texas and thereby preempts inconsistent Oklahoma law.”92
In challenging the Tenth Circuit’s Dormant Commerce Clause hold-
ing, TRWD zeroes in on the rule that that “Congress must manifest its
unambiguous intent before a federal statute will be read to permit or
88. Id. at 1236, 1238, 1246.
89. Id. at 1245.
90. Id. at 1243.
91. Id. at 1245.
92. Herrmann, NO. CIV-07-0045-HE, 2009 WL 3922803, at *3.
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to approve” of protectionist state laws that would otherwise violate
the Commerce Clause.93  TRWD argues that Tenth Circuit’s cobbling
together of phrases from various provisions of the Compact and its
interpretative comments is insufficient to create such an “unmistaka-
bly clear”94 impression as to Congress’s intent.95  In fact, TRWD ar-
gues, the provisions relied on by the Tenth Circuit, when read in their
entirety, do not give any indication of an intention to use the Compact
as a vehicle to grant Oklahoma permission to enact protectionist
laws.96  TRWD goes on to point out that other reasoning employed by
the Tenth Circuit—that the deference to state law embodied in the
general provisions of the Compact demonstrates Congress’s approval
of discriminatory laws—has been expressly rejected in prior Supreme
Court cases.97  Finally, TRWD argues that the Tenth Circuit’s resort to
the Compact’s interpretative comments, which TRWD labels “legisla-
tive history,” is, itself, evidence that there was no “clear” congres-
sional consent to Oklahoma’s discriminatory regulations.98
As to the Tenth Circuit’s preemption analysis, TRWD argues that
language of § 5.05(b) is clear and susceptible to only one interpreta-
tion: that Texas is entitled to 25% of the of the excess flow from
Reach 2, subbasin 5 above 3000 cubic feet, and that it may collect its
portion from outside of Texas.  TRWD insists that the Tenth Circuit’s
reading of § 5.05, with its selective reference to other, more general,
provisions in the Compact, is an impermissible rewriting of the obliga-
tions assigned by the Compact.99  The Tenth Circuit got off on the
wrong foot in its interpretation, TRWD claims, by applying the pre-
sumption against preemption, which in turn led it to give unnatural
meaning to various provisions.  TRWD concedes that the Compact is
technically a federal law, and that it does not contain an express pre-
emption provision;100 nonetheless, TRWD argues, the presumption
has no place in the interpretation of an interstate compact—a contract
between states—because “[a]n interstate compact is not imposed
upon the States by Congress; it is, instead, the product of two or more
States exercising their sovereign prerogative to negotiate a collabora-
tive solution to a common problem.”101
93. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 458 (1992).
94. South-Central, 467 U.S. at 91.
95. Herrmann, NO. CIV-07-0045-HE, 2009 WL 3922803, at *20.
96. See id. at *9.
97. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 959–60 (1982)
(holding that general “deference to state water law” does not “indicate that Congress
wished to remove federal constitutional constraints on such state laws”; rather, such
language must be understood, instead, as deferring only to “valid state law,” an ordi-
nary “ingredient[ ]” of which is conformity with “[t]he negative implications of the
Commerce Clause”).
98. Herrmann, NO. CIV-07-0045-HE, 2009 WL 3922803, at *22.
99. Id. at *28.
100. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
101. Herrmann, NO. CIV-07-0045-HE, 2009 WL 3922803, at *33.
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2. OWRB
Unsurprisingly, given that this case is at the certiorari stage,
OWRB’s legal arguments largely track the reasoning of the Tenth Cir-
cuit.  OWRB spends most of its brief in opposition attempting to con-
vince the Court that its dispute with TRWD is minor, emphasizing
that it is a dispute over just a few words in the Compact, and does not
even involve any of the actual signatories.102
As to the Dormant Commerce Clause issue, OWRB argues that in
consenting to a compact that allocated water among small group of
states—in other words, “legislat[ing] on the specific subject at is-
sue”—Congress blessed those states’ enactment of protectionist re-
gimes regarding that water.103  OWRB insists, as the Tenth Circuit did,
that Sporhase and Wunnicke are distinguishable because they did not
involve interstate compacts governing the articles of commerce at is-
sue in each respective case, and thus lacked this form of Congressional
acquiescence.104
As to the preemption issue, OWRB begins by challenging TRWD’s
interpretation of the Compact language, claiming that overarching
goal of the Compact “is to allow one state to divert its water within its
state and the other to do so within the other state,” and that TRWD’s
interpretation flies in the face of that goal.105  OWRB further en-
dorses the “Tenth Circuit[’s] meticulous interpretation and preemp-
tion analysis of section 5.05(b)(1)’s ‘equal rights’ provision in the
context of the policy and purpose expressed throughout the Com-
pact,”106 insisting that “[h]ad it been the intent of the Compact draft-
ers to allocate the water located within Oklahoma to Texas, after
twenty years of negotiations, surely they would have [clearly] said
so.”107
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CASE
Whichever side you agree with in this case, the importance of the
issues presented cannot be overstated.  Beyond the immediate im-
pacts that will be felt in the water-starved regions of north Texas, if
the Tenth Circuit is correct in its conclusions, many (even most) water
compacts between western states could be significantly weakened, and
the ability of a compact state to hoard its natural resources from the
rest of the country could be greatly enhanced.  These effects will only
be magnified as the need for water increases and disputes of water
become more common.
102. See Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, NO. 11-889, 2012 WL 590128, at
*10–12 (Feb. 21, 2012).
103. Id. at *25.
104. Id. at *25–26.
105. Id. at *28–29.
106. Id. at *30–31.
107. Id at *31.
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A. A License to Hoard
As discussed earlier, the primary purpose of Dormant Commerce
Clause restrictions is to prevent state-level economic protectionism.108
And the reason for the primacy of this purpose is that such protection-
ism “tends to undermine the political union established by the Consti-
tution” and is “likely to provoke retaliation by other states.”109  It
follows then, that anything that makes it easier for states to engage in
economic protectionism—particularly with regard to a vital re-
source—should catch our eye, and should be examined closely.
What the Tenth Circuit did in this case that has the potential to
result in widespread water-protectionism was to take general provi-
sions providing that the Compact is limited to its subject matter; and
that anything outside the compact remains status quo, and which are
present in similar forms in almost all western water compacts; and ele-
vate them to the status of a clear statement of congressional acquies-
cence in discriminatory water export laws.  In other words, if the
Tenth Circuit is correct that a statement in a compact that generically
provides that “[n]othing in this Compact shall be deemed to . . .
[i]nterfere with [water regulations] not inconsistent with its obliga-
tions under this Compact,” grants a state free reign to prevent export
of water, then most states in the western part of this country have a
license to hoard their water at the expense of other states.110  Regard-
less of whether the court’s interpretation is sound, it is unlikely that
this outcome of the compact process was anticipated; it will require a
reexamination of the interstate compact’s place in the resolution of
water disputes, particularly as water-starved states increasingly look to
their more blessed neighbors with a jealous eye.
Further, by encouraging hoarding, the Tenth Circuit’s decision
makes it more likely that disputes between and among states will
emerge and more likely that existing disputes will intensify.  Although
it is doubtful that we will see a return of the “Arizona Navy,” there is
a very real risk that these disputes over water, a resource that we all
need to survive and thrive, will create cycles of retaliation that leave
us all worse off.
B. Costly Uncertainty
As already noted, the primary value of water compacts is their abil-
ity to settle expectations and allow for the type of advanced planning
that is necessary for future economic development.  It is vital for this
settling of expectations that the terms and provisions of a compact
108. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1977) (adopting a “virtually
per se rule of invalidity” for discriminatory state statutes that raise the specter of
economic protectionism).
109. Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine,
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 485 (2008).
110. Herrmann, 656 F.3d at 1222.
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have a clear and unchanging meaning.  If the Tenth Circuit is correct,
however, that the presumption against preemption guides the inter-
pretation of an interstate compact’s terms, the predictability gains
from existing compacts will be greatly reduced.  This is because em-
ploying the presumption against preemption to compacts encourages
their rewriting by courts.  Instead of searching for the plainest or most
obvious reading of a provision when such a provision conflicts with a
state law, courts instead will actively seek out an interpretation that
saves state laws, adopting that interpretation so long as it is not “un-
reasonable.”111  This greatly increases the range of possible interpreta-
tions of any given provision, and consequently diminishes the
certainty that these provisions would otherwise provide.
An additional, and related, increase in uncertainty following from
the application of the presumption against preemption to interstate
compacts is the incentive it provides for states to get creative in their
lawmaking in order to shirk their responsibilities under a compact.
Knowing that a compact provision that conflicts with a state law will
be given not necessarily the best interpretation, but a “reasonable”
interpretation that saves the conflicting state law, a state has an incen-
tive to pass a law that directly conflicts with the best interpretation of
an unfavorable provision.  Such a perverse incentive makes it that
much more difficult to achieve the important goal of settling
expectations.
C. Federal Intervention
This increase in uncertainty with respect to the meaning of compact
provisions and the likelihood of interstate disputes reduces the value
of existing compacts and could make future compacts more difficult to
execute.  The ultimate outcome of this unraveling of the carefully-bal-
anced network of interstate compacts that govern allocation of the
nation’s water is likely to be increased litigation and, eventually, solu-
tions imposed by Congress.
One large advantage compacts have over litigation is that their out-
comes are much more predictable.112  As the uncertainty of compact
outcomes increase, their value relative to litigation decreases.  If states
come to believe that any “sensible compromise” can be undone by
signatories later in the game, they are likely to prefer trying their luck
in the courtroom upfront, where they have a chance to score a water
windfall, rather than engaging in what are often protracted negotia-
tions.113  This is a possibility that should give us pause, because, to put
111. Id. at 1245.
112. See Horne, supra note 28.
113. Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 84-346, 69 Stat. 654 (1955) (showing that
negotiations on the Red River Compact were authorized by Congress in 1955).  Red
River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305 (1980) (showing that the Compact
was not ratified by Congress until 1980.).
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it bluntly, courts are “very bad at resolving interstate water
disputes.”114
In addition, as noted above, Congress has the power to undo previ-
ously executed compacts; if it sees that current compacts are becoming
ineffective and increasing, rather than decreasing interstate strife, it
may put that power to use.  The odds of intervention increase as states
seek to alleviate water shortages in environmentally-risky ways115 and
as state disputes encroach on federal water interests.116  In considering
this possibility, it is important to remember that a state like Texas,
with its thirty-six representatives in the House, will have far more
clout in such disputes than a state like Oklahoma, with only five.
V. CONCLUSION
The need for cooperation in resolving interstate water disputes has
never been greater.  The most effective mode of encouraging this nec-
essary cooperation over the past 100 years has been the interstate
compact.  The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Tarrant, however, raises
questions about the continuing viability of these compacts.  These
questions are of vital importance, not just to the future of the Ameri-
can West, but to the entire country.
114. Horne, supra note 28, at 104.
115. In this case, for example, TRWD’s alternatives to acquiring its water from
Oklahoma pose a much greater environmental impact. See WATER PLAN, supra note
57, at 4E.15–16.
116. Again, using this case as an example, the Hugo, Sardis (formerly Clayton), and
Tuskahoma federal reservoirs—all located in southeastern Oklahoma within Reach 2,
subbasin 5—were expressly authorized as water sources for both Oklahoma and
North Texas.  At the time the reservoirs were under consideration, Oklahoma’s antici-
pated future water demands did not justify the cost of their construction.  Thus,
Oklahoma legislators represented that the demands of North Texas (and specifically
Tarrant) should be taken into account to justify Congress’s authorization and subse-
quent funding of the projects. See, e.g., HEARING BEFORE SUBCOMM. OF THE COMM.
OF PUBLIC WORDS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 84TH CONG. (1956) (statement of Okla.
Sen. Monroney) (“[T]he water for sale to municipalities, such great municipalities as
Dallas and Fort Worth . . . [a]nd others that are desperate for . . . water supply . . . will
not only reimburse the cost of the upstream dams, but it will carry the cost of the
auxiliary dam, the dry dam located at Millwood.”).
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